Climate cooperation in the shadow of solar geoengineering: an experimental investigation of the moral hazard conjecture

Abstract

As international efforts to mitigate greenhouse gases continue to fall short of global targets, the scientific community increasingly debates the role of solar geoengineering in climate policy. Given the infancy of these technologies, the debate is not yet whether to deploy solar geoengineering but whether solar geoengineering deserves consideration and research funding. Looming large over this discussion is the moral hazard conjecture – normalizing solar geoengineering will decrease mitigation efforts. Using a controlled experiment of a collective-risk social dilemma that simulates the strategic decisions of heterogeneous groups to mitigate emissions and deploy solar geoengineering, we find no evidence for the moral hazard conjecture. On the contrary, when people in the experiment are given the option to deploy solar geoengineering, average investment in mitigation increases.