Vis enkel innførsel

dc.contributor.authorBang, Guri
dc.contributor.authorHovi, Jon
dc.contributor.authorSkodvin, Tora
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-25T14:19:34Z
dc.date.available2018-01-25T14:19:34Z
dc.date.created2016-09-12T13:01:49Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationPolitics and Governance. 2016, 4 (3), 209-218.
dc.identifier.issn2183-2463
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2479700
dc.description.abstractThe 2015 Paris Agreement was widely greeted with enthusiasm. We assess the short-term and long-term potential effectiveness of Paris. Concerning short-term effectiveness, we contend that while Paris scores high on participation, and reasonably high on the depth of the parties’ commitments (ambition), its Achilles’ heel will likely be compliance. Concerning long-term effectiveness, we argue that Paris does little to restructure states’ incentives so as to avoid free riding. At worst, it might end up as a failure, much like Kyoto did. On the other hand, domestic and international norms could continue to develop in a direction that makes it more and more difficult for individuals, firms, and states alike to ignore the plea to limit and reduce their carbon footprints. Technological progress that gradually reduces abatement costs, combined with leadership by major emitters such as the United States, might further strengthen climate cooperation and enhance other countries’ willingness to follow through. However, deep political polarization continues to represent a significant barrier to U.S. leadership on climate change.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.titleThe Paris Agreement: Short-term and Long-term Effectiveness
dc.typePeer reviewed
dc.typeJournal article
dc.description.versionpublishedVersion
dc.source.pagenumber209-218
dc.source.volume4
dc.source.journalPolitics and Governance
dc.source.issue3
dc.identifier.doi10.17645/pag.v4i3.640
dc.identifier.cristin1380324
cristin.unitcode7475,0,0,0
cristin.unitnameCICERO Senter for klimaforskning
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode1


Tilhørende fil(er)

Thumbnail

Denne innførselen finnes i følgende samling(er)

Vis enkel innførsel