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dc.contributor.authorSælen, Håkon
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-15T15:54:17Z
dc.date.available2018-01-15T15:54:17Z
dc.date.created2015-11-17T16:31:27Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationInternational Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics. 2015, .nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn1567-9764
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2477648
dc.descriptionThis is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-015-9311-8nb_NO
dc.description.abstractClimate clubs have been suggested as a gateway to substantial reductions in global emissions. The club approach begins with a small number of enthusiastic countries. This paper asks under what conditions such clubs are likely to evolve into effective cooperation through side-payments to new members. The question is addressed through a range of formal thought experiments using numerical simulations. The model is calibrated using empirical data on countries’ emissions, GDP, populations, and vulnerabilities. It is simple and stylized, but allows for complex and dynamic interactions between actors. Basic equity considerations can be accommodated. The results indicate that side-payments’ theoretical potential for facilitating effective clubs is large. One or two large emitters can initiate a club that grows to cover a substantial share of global emissions if the global benefit–cost ratio for mitigation is around 3 or larger. The size of stable clubs is larger if new members contribute to making side-payments, and somewhat lower if equity considerations constrain the set of possible transfers. Side-payments’ effect is enabled by the large asymmetries between countries. Total side-payment flows range from tens to hundreds of billions of US dollars annually.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.titleSide-payments: an effective instrument for building climate clubs?nb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber24nb_NO
dc.source.journalInternational Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economicsnb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10784-015-9311-8
dc.identifier.cristin1290106
dc.relation.projectNorges forskningsråd: 209701nb_NO
cristin.unitcode7475,0,0,0
cristin.unitnameCICERO Senter for klimaforskning
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode1


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