Browsing CICERO Working Papers by Author "Hovi, Jon"

Betingete posisjoner i klimaforhandlingene

Hovi, Jon; Holtsmark, Bjart (CICERO Working Paper;1997:09, Working paper, 1997)

Decentralized enforcement, sequential bargaining, and the Clean Development Mechanism

Hovi, Jon (CICERO Working Paper;2001:12, Working paper, 2001)

While there is a vast literature both on international bargaining and on how international agreements can be enforced, very little work has been done on how bargaining and enforcement interact. An important exception is ...

Enforcing the climate regime: Game theory and the Marrakesh Accords

Hovi, Jon (CICERO Working Paper;2002:06, Working paper, 2002)

This article reviews basic insights about compliance and “hard” enforcement that can be derived from various non-cooperative equilibrium concepts, and evaluates the Marrakesh Accords in light of these insights. Five different ...

Føre var-prinsippet som rasjonelt beslutningskriterium

Hovi, Jon (CICERO Working Paper;2001:13, Working paper, 2001)

Notatet spør om føre var-prinsippet kan betraktes som et rasjonelt beslutningskriterium. Forfatteren fokuserer på i alt seks uavklarte spørsmål: 1. Representerer prinsippet et bestemt sett av politiske handlingsalternativer, ...

The Price of Non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol: The Remarkable Case of Norway

Hovi, Jon; Kallbekken, Steffen (CICERO Working Paper;2004:07, Working paper, 2004)

To induce compliance, an international enforcement mechanism needs to authorize the use of punitive consequences against a non-compliant country. However, it is reasonable to require that such consequences do not cause ...

The Theory of Full International Cooperation: An Experimental Evaluation

Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon (CICERO Working Paper;2004:06, Working paper, 2004)

The concept of renegotiation-proof equilibrium has become a cornerstone in recent game theoretic reasoning about the stability of international environmental agreements. Applying this solution concept to a linear version ...