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dc.contributor.authorHagem, Cathrinenb_NO
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-17T14:31:29Z
dc.date.available2014-03-17T14:31:29Z
dc.date.issued2001nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0504-452Xnb_NO
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/192386
dc.description.abstractThere is a concern in many countries that a domestic tradable quota system for greenhouse gases, where all emitters must pay for their quotas, may lead to closures of emissions-intensive industrial companies. Allocating quotas free of charge to companies operating in competitive markets has been suggested as a means to reduce the likelihood of closures. Two different designs of quota systems are studied within a two-period model: one where the quotas given free of charge are tradable, and one where the quotas are non-tradable. The two quota systems are compared with respect to their ability both to induce the firms to implement investment in abatement technology and to prevent or postpone closures.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherCICERO Center for International Climate and Environmental Research - Oslonb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofCICERO Working Papernb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCICERO Working Paper;2001:06nb_NO
dc.titleThe merits of non-tradable quotas as a domestic policy instrument to prevent firm closurenb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber18nb_NO


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