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dc.contributor.authorHagem, Cathrinenb_NO
dc.contributor.authorMæstad, Ottarnb_NO
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-17T14:31:26Z
dc.date.available2014-03-17T14:31:26Z
dc.date.issued2002nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0504-452Xnb_NO
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/192352
dc.description.abstractImplementation of the Kyoto Protocol is likely to leave Russa and other Eastern European countries with market power in the market for emission permits. Ceteris paribus, this will raise the permit price above the competitive permit price. However, Russia is also a large exporter of fossil fuels. A high price on emission permits may lower the producer price on fossil fuels. Thus if Russia coordinates its permit market and fossil fuel market policies, market power will not necessarily lead to a higher permit price. Fossil fuel producers may also exert market power in the permit market, provided they conceive the permit price to be influeneced by their production volumes. If higher volumes drive up the permit price, Russian fuel producers may become more aggressive relative to their competitors in the fuel markets if the sale of fuels is coordinated with the sale of permits. The result is reversed if high fuel production drives the permit price down.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherCICERO Center for International Climate and Environmental Research - Oslonb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofCICERO Working Papernb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCICERO Working Paper;2002:08nb_NO
dc.titleMarket power in the market for greenhouse gas emission permits - the interplay with the fossil fuel marketsnb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber21nb_NO


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