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dc.contributor.authorHagem, Cathrinenb_NO
dc.contributor.authorWestskog, Hegenb_NO
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-17T14:31:22Z
dc.date.available2014-03-17T14:31:22Z
dc.date.issued2004nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0504-452Xnb_NO
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/192306
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyze how restricting intertemporal trading by prohibiting borrowing of emission permits affects the ability of a dominant agent to exploit its market power, and the consequences this has for the cost-effectiveness of implementing an emissions target. We show that the monopolist could take advantage of the constraint on borrowing by distributing the sale of permits ineffectively across periods, and moreover that this inefficiency is influenced by the way permits are initially allocated between agents. A cost-effective distribution of abatement across periods can be achieved by an appropriate distribution of the total endowments of permits over time for each agent.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherCICERO Center for International Climate and Environmental Research - Oslonb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofCICERO Working Papernb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCICERO Working Paper;2004:11nb_NO
dc.titleDominant agents and intertemporal emissions tradingnb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber22nb_NO


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