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dc.contributor.authorHagem, Cathrinenb_NO
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-17T14:31:10Z
dc.date.available2014-03-17T14:31:10Z
dc.date.issued1994nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0504-452Xnb_NO
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/192208
dc.description.abstractJoint Implementation (JI) under the Framework Convention of Climate Change means that countries could partly offset their national abatement commitments by investing in CO2 abatement projects abroad. JI is introduced as a mechanism for achieving a certain global abatement target less costly by separating the commitments from the implementation of measures. This paper studies the design of a JI contract when the investor has incomplete information about the foreign firm which carries out the JI project (the host). Asymmetric information leads to a decrease in the potential costsavings from JI. Furthermore, private information held by the potential host firm could give the firm a significant positive utility of participating in JI projects. The possibility of being a host for a JI project in the future can prevent potential host firms from investing in profitable abatement projects today. The paper analyzes the impact on emissions of CO2 of strategic behavior among potential hosts for JI projects.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherCICERO Center for International Climate and Environmental Research - Oslonb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofCICERO Working Papernb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCICERO Working Paper;1994:12nb_NO
dc.titleJoint Implementation under asymmetric information and strategic behaviournb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.source.pagenumbernb_NO


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