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dc.contributor.authorHagem, Cathrinenb_NO
dc.contributor.authorWestskog, Hegenb_NO
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-17T14:31:07Z
dc.date.available2014-03-17T14:31:07Z
dc.date.issued1996nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0504-452Xnb_NO
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/192176
dc.description.abstractMarket power within a system of tradeable CO2-quotas leads to a non-optimal distribution of abatement across countries. In this paper we introduce a quota system that may reduce the adverse effects of market power, and thereby result in a distribution of abatement across countries that is closer to a cost-effective outcome. However, this system leads to a non-optimal distribution of abatement across periods. Hence, we face a trade-off between a cost-effective distribution of abatement across periods and reduced adverse effects of market power.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherCICERO Center for International Climate and Environmental Research - Oslonb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofCICERO Working Papernb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCICERO Working Paper;1996:02nb_NO
dc.titleThe design of a tradeable CO2-quota system under market imperfectionsnb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.source.pagenumbernb_NO


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