dc.contributor.author | Hagem, Cathrine | nb_NO |
dc.contributor.author | Westskog, Hege | nb_NO |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-03-17T14:31:07Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-03-17T14:31:07Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1996 | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.issn | 0504-452X | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/192176 | |
dc.description.abstract | Market power within a system of tradeable CO2-quotas leads to a non-optimal distribution of abatement across countries. In this paper we introduce a quota system that may reduce the adverse effects of market power, and thereby result in a distribution of abatement across countries that is closer to a cost-effective outcome. However, this system leads to a non-optimal distribution of abatement across periods. Hence, we face a trade-off between a cost-effective distribution of abatement across periods and reduced adverse effects of market power. | nb_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
dc.publisher | CICERO Center for International Climate and Environmental Research - Oslo | nb_NO |
dc.relation.ispartof | CICERO Working Paper | nb_NO |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 1996:02 | nb_NO |
dc.title | The design of a tradeable CO2-quota system under market imperfections | nb_NO |
dc.type | Working paper | nb_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | | nb_NO |
dc.identifier.cristin | 447890 | |