• A credible compliance enforcement system for the climate regime 

      Hovi, Jon; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine; Holtsmark, Bjart (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2012)
      The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, ...
    • A credible compliance enforcement system for the climate regime 

      Hovi, Jon; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine; Holtsmark, Bjart (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2012)
      The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, ...
    • Betingete posisjoner i klimaforhandlingene 

      Hovi, Jon; Holtsmark, Bjart (CICERO Working Paper;1997:09, Working paper, 1997)
    • Can conditional commitments break the climate change negotiations deadlock? 

      Underdal, Arild; Hovi, Jon; Kallbekken, Steffen; Skodvin, Tora (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2012)
      Can a conditional commitment by a major actor (for example, the European Union) induce other major actors (such as the USA, China, India, or Japan) to do more to mitigate global climate change? We analyse this question by ...
    • Climate Clubs: a Gateway to Effective Climate Cooperation? 

      Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef; Sælen, Håkon; Underdal, Arild (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2017)
      Although the Paris Agreement arguably made some progress, interest in supplementary approaches to climate change co-operation persist. This article examines the conditions under which a climate club might emerge and grow. ...
    • Decentralized enforcement, sequential bargaining, and the Clean Development Mechanism 

      Hovi, Jon (CICERO Working Paper;2001:12, Working paper, 2001)
      While there is a vast literature both on international bargaining and on how international agreements can be enforced, very little work has been done on how bargaining and enforcement interact. An important exception is ...
    • Enforcing the climate regime: Game theory and the Marrakesh Accords 

      Hovi, Jon (CICERO Working Paper;2002:06, Working paper, 2002)
      This article reviews basic insights about compliance and “hard” enforcement that can be derived from various non-cooperative equilibrium concepts, and evaluates the Marrakesh Accords in light of these insights. Five different ...
    • Føre var-prinsippet som rasjonelt beslutningskriterium 

      Hovi, Jon (CICERO Working Paper;2001:13, Working paper, 2001)
      Notatet spør om føre var-prinsippet kan betraktes som et rasjonelt beslutningskriterium. Forfatteren fokuserer på i alt seks uavklarte spørsmål: 1. Representerer prinsippet et bestemt sett av politiske handlingsalternativer, ...
    • The Paris Agreement: Short-term and Long-term Effectiveness 

      Bang, Guri; Hovi, Jon; Skodvin, Tora (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2016)
      The 2015 Paris Agreement was widely greeted with enthusiasm. We assess the short-term and long-term potential effectiveness of Paris. Concerning short-term effectiveness, we contend that while Paris scores high on ...
    • The Paris Agreement: Short-term and Long-term Effectiveness 

      Bang, Guri; Hovi, Jon; Skodvin, Tora (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2016)
      The 2015 Paris Agreement was widely greeted with enthusiasm. We assess the short-term and long-term potential effectiveness of Paris. Concerning short-term effectiveness, we contend that while Paris scores high on ...
    • The Price of Non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol: The Remarkable Case of Norway 

      Hovi, Jon; Kallbekken, Steffen (CICERO Working Paper;2004:07, Working paper, 2004)
      To induce compliance, an international enforcement mechanism needs to authorize the use of punitive consequences against a non-compliant country. However, it is reasonable to require that such consequences do not cause ...
    • The Theory of Full International Cooperation: An Experimental Evaluation 

      Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon (CICERO Working Paper;2004:06, Working paper, 2004)
      The concept of renegotiation-proof equilibrium has become a cornerstone in recent game theoretic reasoning about the stability of international environmental agreements. Applying this solution concept to a linear version ...
    • When Does Informal Enforcement Work? 

      Aakre, Stine; Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2016)
      We study experimentally how enforcement influences public goods provision when subjects face two free-rider options that roughly parallel the nonparticipation and noncompliance options available for countries in relation ...
    • Why the United States did not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol: German, Norwegian, and US perspectives 

      Hovi, Jon; Sprinz, Detlef F.; Bang, Guri (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2012)
      According to two-level game theory, negotiators tailor agreements at the international level to be ratifiable at the domestic level. This did not happen in the Kyoto negotiations, however, in the US case. We interviewed ...