• A credible compliance enforcement system for the climate regime 

      Hovi, Jon; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine; Holtsmark, Bjart (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2012)
      The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, ...
    • A credible compliance enforcement system for the climate regime 

      Hovi, Jon; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine; Holtsmark, Bjart (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2012)
      The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, ...
    • A Kantian approach to a sustainable development indicator for climate 

      Greaker, Mads; Stoknes, Per Espen; Alfsen, Knut H.; Ericson, Torgeir (CICERO Working Paper;2012:02, Research report, 2012)
      How can the informed citizen know if the government is implementing a good-enough climate change policy? Most developed democracies have their own set of indicators for sustainable development, including indicators for ...
    • Sustaining Welfare for Future Generations. A Review Note on the Capital Approach to the Measurement of Sustainable Development 

      Moe, Thorvald; Alfsen, Knut H.; Greaker, Mads (CICERO Policy Note;2013:01, Working paper, 2013)
      The objective of this policy paper is twofold: -To present an update on an economic approach to measure sustainable development - the capital approach - and how this approach may be combined with the ecological approach ...