The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, ...

The purpose of this paper is to compare the effect of different domestic climate policy instruments under asymmetric information when the regulator wants to secure the survival of a specific firm. It is a well-known result ...

In this paper we analyze how restricting intertemporal trading by prohibiting borrowing of emission permits affects the ability of a dominant agent to exploit its market power, and the consequences this has for the ...

American president George W. Bush has declared that he will not ask the Senate to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This commentary explores the potential impact of implementing the Kyoto Protocol without the participation of the ...

The aim of this report is to analyze the conditions under which Joint Implementation (JI) can contribute to a costeffective abatement of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. JI refers to policies and measures implemented ...

Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is likely to leave Russa and other Eastern European countries with market power in the market for emission permits. Ceteris paribus, this will raise the permit price above the competitive ...

In this paper we consider how to design a national tradable quota system to reduce emissions of climate gases when the regulator is concerned about the survival of specific firms. The problem is studied using a two-period ...

There is a concern in many countries that a domestic tradable quota system for greenhouse gases, where all emitters must pay for their quotas, may lead to closures of emissions-intensive industrial companies. Allocating ...

This paper looks at how strategic considerations may play a role in the decision of whether or not to impose sanctions on Parties who are not in compliance with their commitments to the Kyoto Protocol. A member of the ...