• A credible compliance enforcement system for the climate regime 

      Hovi, Jon; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine; Holtsmark, Bjart (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2012)
      The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, ...
    • A credible compliance enforcement system for the climate regime 

      Hovi, Jon; Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine; Holtsmark, Bjart (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2012)
      The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, ...