Blar i CICERO Working Papers på forfatter "Westskog, Hege"
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Combining insights from economics and social psychology to explain environmentally significant consumption
Kallbekken, Steffen; Rise, Jostein; Westskog, Hege (CICERO Working Paper;2008:02, Working paper, 2008)In this paper we propose a comprehensive model for environmentally significant consumption. The immediate purpose is to improve our ability to understand such consumption. The underlying purpose is to improve our ability ... -
Dominant agents and intertemporal emissions trading
Hagem, Cathrine; Westskog, Hege (CICERO Working Paper;2004:11, Working paper, 2004)In this paper we analyze how restricting intertemporal trading by prohibiting borrowing of emission permits affects the ability of a dominant agent to exploit its market power, and the consequences this has for the ... -
Market power with interdependent demand: Sale of emission permits and natural gas from the Former Soviet Union
Hagem, Cathrine; Kallbekken, Steffen; Mæstad, Ottar; Westskog, Hege (CICERO Working Paper;2004:01, Working paper, 2004)With implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, the Former Soviet Union countries, and Russia in particular, will most likely be able to exert market power in the emission permit market. However, since these countries are also ... -
National climate policy, firm survival, and investments
Hagem, Cathrine; Westskog, Hege (CICERO Working Paper;2000:08, Working paper, 2000)In this paper we consider how to design a national tradable quota system to reduce emissions of climate gases when the regulator is concerned about the survival of specific firms. The problem is studied using a two-period ... -
Should developing countries take on binding commitments in a climate agreement? A cost-benefit analysis
Kallbekken, Steffen; Westskog, Hege (CICERO Working Paper;2003:09, Working paper, 2003)This paper explores the costs and benefits for all parties to a future climate agreement of developing countries taking on binding commitments. Such commitments would allow developing countries to participate in emissions ... -
The design of a tradeable CO2-quota system under market imperfections
Hagem, Cathrine; Westskog, Hege (CICERO Working Paper;1996:02, Working paper, 1996)Market power within a system of tradeable CO2-quotas leads to a non-optimal distribution of abatement across countries. In this paper we introduce a quota system that may reduce the adverse effects of market power, and ... -
The Kyoto mechanisms and the quest for compliance: Unresolved issues and potential pitfalls
Malvik, Henrik; Westskog, Hege (CICERO Working Paper;2001:03, Working paper, 2001)The purpose of this paper is to illuminate potential problems with the flexibility mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol connected to the establishment of an enforcement system. The Kyoto mechanisms are emission trading, Joint ... -
Tough justice for small nations: How strategic behaviour can influence the enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol
Hagem, Cathrine; Kallbekken, Steffen; Mæstad, Ottar; Westskog, Hege (CICERO Working Paper;2003:01, Working paper, 2003)This paper looks at how strategic considerations may play a role in the decision of whether or not to impose sanctions on Parties who are not in compliance with their commitments to the Kyoto Protocol. A member of the ... -
Why quota trade should be restricted: The arguments behind the EU position on emissions trading
Westskog, Hege (CICERO Working Paper;2001:07, Working paper, 2001)In this paper I try to clarify the background and arguments behind the EU position on emissions trading in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol and their suggestions of how the supplementarity cap in the Kyoto agreement can be ...