Blar i CICERO Working Papers på forfatter "Kallbekken, Steffen"
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A choice experiment on fuel taxation and earmarking in Norway
Sælen, Håkon; Kallbekken, Steffen (CICERO Working Paper;2010:02, Working paper, 2010) -
Can geological carbon storage be competitive?
Kallbekken, Steffen; Torvanger, Asbjørn (CICERO Working Paper;2004:05, Working paper, 2004)In this paper we review the literature on the costs and benefits of geological carbon storage and the estimates of greenhouse gas permit prices under the Kyoto Protocol commitment period and beyond. Combining these results ... -
CDM baseline methodologies and carbon leakage
Kallbekken, Steffen; Flottorp, Line Sunniva; Rive, Nathan (CICERO Working Paper;2006:03, Working paper, 2006)Carbon leakage is an important issue because it can reduce the environmental effectiveness of international climate agreements. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) can potentially reduce carbon ... -
Combining insights from economics and social psychology to explain environmentally significant consumption
Kallbekken, Steffen; Rise, Jostein; Westskog, Hege (CICERO Working Paper;2008:02, Working paper, 2008)In this paper we propose a comprehensive model for environmentally significant consumption. The immediate purpose is to improve our ability to understand such consumption. The underlying purpose is to improve our ability ... -
Market power with interdependent demand: Sale of emission permits and natural gas from the Former Soviet Union
Hagem, Cathrine; Kallbekken, Steffen; Mæstad, Ottar; Westskog, Hege (CICERO Working Paper;2004:01, Working paper, 2004)With implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, the Former Soviet Union countries, and Russia in particular, will most likely be able to exert market power in the emission permit market. However, since these countries are also ... -
Public accept for environmental taxes: self-interest, environmental and distributional concerns
Kallbekken, Steffen; Sælen, Håkon (CICERO Working Paper;2010:01, Working paper, 2010) -
Should developing countries take on binding commitments in a climate agreement? A cost-benefit analysis
Kallbekken, Steffen; Westskog, Hege (CICERO Working Paper;2003:09, Working paper, 2003)This paper explores the costs and benefits for all parties to a future climate agreement of developing countries taking on binding commitments. Such commitments would allow developing countries to participate in emissions ... -
The cost of sectoral differentiation: The case of the EU emissions trading scheme
Kallbekken, Steffen (CICERO Working Paper;2004:08, Working paper, 2004)It is often assumed in the economic literature that the Kyoto Protocol will be implemented through a cost-efficient, comprehensive emissions trading system. However, the general experience from implementation of environmental ... -
The Impact of Trial Runs on the Acceptability of Pigouvian Taxes: Experimental Evidence
Cherry, Todd; Kallbekken, Steffen; Kroll, Stephan (CICERO Working Paper;2011:01, Working paper, 2011)This paper examines the political difficulty of enacting welfare-enhancing Pigouvian taxes. Using referenda in a market experiment with externalities, we investigate the effect of trial periods on the acceptability of two ... -
The Norwegian fast start climate finance contribution
Moe, Thorvald; Kallbekken, Steffen (CICERO Working Paper;2013:02, Working paper, 2013)This Working Paper is part of a series of studies initiated by The Overseas Development Institute, ODI, scrutinizing how developing countries are defining, delivering and reporting on fast start finance - FSF. Norwegian ... -
The Price of Non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol: The Remarkable Case of Norway
Hovi, Jon; Kallbekken, Steffen (CICERO Working Paper;2004:07, Working paper, 2004)To induce compliance, an international enforcement mechanism needs to authorize the use of punitive consequences against a non-compliant country. However, it is reasonable to require that such consequences do not cause ... -
Tough justice for small nations: How strategic behaviour can influence the enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol
Hagem, Cathrine; Kallbekken, Steffen; Mæstad, Ottar; Westskog, Hege (CICERO Working Paper;2003:01, Working paper, 2003)This paper looks at how strategic considerations may play a role in the decision of whether or not to impose sanctions on Parties who are not in compliance with their commitments to the Kyoto Protocol. A member of the ... -
Why the CDM can reduce carbon leakage
Kallbekken, Steffen (CICERO Working Paper;2006:02, Working paper, 2006)Carbon leakage is an important concern because it can reduce the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. The Clean Development Mechanism, one of the flexibility mechanisms allowed under the protocol, has the ...