Vis enkel innførsel

dc.contributor.authorBirkelund, Johan
dc.contributor.authorCherry, Todd
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-04T08:52:00Z
dc.date.available2021-10-04T08:52:00Z
dc.date.created2020-02-21T13:43:44Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2020, 170 355-361.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2787386
dc.description.abstractThis paper reports on an experiment that investigates how inequality in advantage affects individual preferences for honesty and generosity. In a two-stage experiment, subjects first earn money according to self-reported production, which can include honest and dishonest reports. Subjects then play the dictator game and decide how much, if any, of their earnings to share with an anonymous recipient. Treatments investigate how equal and unequal advantages in production affect the extent of cheating in stage one and the subsequent offers in stage two. When advantage randomly benefits only some of the group, the relatively disadvantaged are significantly more dishonest and exhibit significantly less other-regarding behavior. Considering the interplay between cheating and giving, we find that greater cheating was followed with greater giving. And comparing this relationship across treatments suggests self-justification for dishonest behavior makes subjects feel more entitled to their ill-gotten gains.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.titleInstitutional inequality and individual preferences for honesty and generosityen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionen_US
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en_US
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Economics: 212en_US
dc.source.pagenumber355-361en_US
dc.source.volume170en_US
dc.source.journalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organizationen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.014
dc.identifier.cristin1796528
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2


Tilhørende fil(er)

Thumbnail

Denne innførselen finnes i følgende samling(er)

Vis enkel innførsel