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dc.contributor.authorCherry, Toddnb_NO
dc.contributor.authorKallbekken, Steffennb_NO
dc.contributor.authorKroll, Stephannb_NO
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-17T14:31:35Z
dc.date.available2014-03-17T14:31:35Z
dc.date.issued2011nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0504-452Xnb_NO
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/192442
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the political difficulty of enacting welfare-enhancing Pigouvian taxes. Using referenda in a market experiment with externalities, we investigate the effect of trial periods on the acceptability of two theoretically equivalent variants of Pigouvian taxes. While implementing either tax is in subjects’ material self-interest, we find significant levels of opposition to both tax schemes, though the level differs considerably. Results show that trial runs can overcome initial tax aversion, significantly increasing acceptability. The effect is robust across tax schemes, but a trial with one scheme does not affect the acceptability of the other. Trial periods also mitigate initial biases in preferences of alternative tax schemes.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherCICERO Center for International Climate and Environmental Research - Oslonb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofCICERO Working Papernb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCICERO Working Paper;2011:01nb_NO
dc.titleThe Impact of Trial Runs on the Acceptability of Pigouvian Taxes: Experimental Evidencenb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber14nb_NO


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