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dc.contributor.authorHagem, Cathrinenb_NO
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-17T14:30:05Z
dc.date.available2014-03-17T14:30:05Z
dc.date.issued1996nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0804-4562nb_NO
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/192106
dc.description.abstractMarginal abatement costs differ among countries. A climate treaty that specifies fixed emissions reductions for the different countries that participate will therefore, in general, not achieve a cost-effective distribution of abatement across countries. International taxes on carbon dioxide (CO2), tradable quotas and joint implementation (or other kinds of sidepayments) have often been suggested as policy instruments in an international climate treaty because they can reduce the total cost of achieving a certain global target for emissions relative to "fixed reduction" types of agreements. The cost-effectiveness of taxes, tradable quotas and joint implementation or other kinds of side-payments may be reduced in the case of limited participation in the climate treaty, asymmetric information and market imperfections. The thesis points out how these factors influence the cost-effectiveness and the optimal design of the policy instruments.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherCICERO Center for International Climate and Environmental Research - Oslonb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofCICERO Reportnb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCICERO Report;1996:06nb_NO
dc.titleClimate agreements under limited participation, asymmetric information and market imperfections: A summary of a Dr.polit. Thesisnb_NO
dc.typeResearch reportnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumbernb_NO


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