Blar i CICERO Research Archive på forfatter "Helland, Leif"

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    • Climate Leadership by Conditional Commitments 

      Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon; Sælen, Håkon (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2017)
      Under the 2015 Paris climate agreement, each Party sets its own mitigation target by submitting a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) every five years. An important question is whether including conditional components ...

    • Group size effects in two repeated game models of a global climate agreement 

      Helland, Leif (CICERO Working Paper;2002:05, Working paper, 2002)
      What levels of total abatement can one hope for in a global climate agreement? Some potential answers to this question are provided by game theory. This working paper contains a critical discussion of two (prominent) game ...

    • The Theory of Full International Cooperation: An Experimental Evaluation 

      Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon (CICERO Working Paper;2004:06, Working paper, 2004)
      The concept of renegotiation-proof equilibrium has become a cornerstone in recent game theoretic reasoning about the stability of international environmental agreements. Applying this solution concept to a linear version ...

    • When Does Informal Enforcement Work? 

      Aakre, Stine; Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2016)
      We study experimentally how enforcement influences public goods provision when subjects face two free-rider options that roughly parallel the nonparticipation and noncompliance options available for countries in relation ...