• Group size effects in two repeated game models of a global climate agreement 

      Helland, Leif (CICERO Working Paper;2002:05, Working paper, 2002)
      What levels of total abatement can one hope for in a global climate agreement? Some potential answers to this question are provided by game theory. This working paper contains a critical discussion of two (prominent) game ...
    • The Theory of Full International Cooperation: An Experimental Evaluation 

      Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon (CICERO Working Paper;2004:06, Working paper, 2004)
      The concept of renegotiation-proof equilibrium has become a cornerstone in recent game theoretic reasoning about the stability of international environmental agreements. Applying this solution concept to a linear version ...
    • When Does Informal Enforcement Work? 

      Aakre, Stine; Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2016)
      We study experimentally how enforcement influences public goods provision when subjects face two free-rider options that roughly parallel the nonparticipation and noncompliance options available for countries in relation ...